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tions that when the questibn does arise, it will be decided in accordance
with the minority viewpoint.
Illinois is among the strictest states in the matter of the admissibility
of evidence of prior convictions to impeach a defendant who takes the
stand in his own behalf.40 In addition, Illinois is one of the few states in
which a distinction is drawn between a defendant as a witness and a non-
party witness.4 1 Where this degree of definition is attempted, it is not too
highly speculative to allow that the courts will be wary of submitting
the rights of a defendant-witness (if not a non-party witness, or the party
for whom he appears) to the prejudice which might result from admitting
in evidence an appealed conviction.
CONCLUSION
It has been observed that of the jurisdictions which have passed on the
point, two out of three federal circuits and eight out of ten states will
allow evidence of a prior conviction to be used to impeach a witness, even
though the conviction relied upon is being appealed at the time of its
introduction into evidence. The case for admitting evidence of a prior
conviction, to impeach a witness, is not as strong as might appear from
a mere statistical tabulation of cases pro and con, as the vast majority of
jurisdictions have not yet considered the point.
In summary, the question resolves itself to a simple one. Should the jury
hear all the facts concerning the credibility of a witness, even at the risk
of injecting highly prejudicial matter into the trial? Specifically, if the
witness is found, on appeal, to be innocent of the crime convicted of, then
the calling party, or the witness himself (if he is the defendant), has been
unduly prejudiced by the discrediting of the witness. Hope for the solu-
tion of this legal dilemma lies either in the hands of the legislature, or
perhaps in a clearly-defined judicial decision from one of the jurisdictions
from which there has been no adjudication in this area.
40 111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, S 587.
41 See, for example, People v. Roche, 389 Ill. 361, 59 N.E. 2d 866 (1945) and People v.
Halkens, 386 Ill. 167, 53 N.E. 2d 923 (1944). On the other hand, People v. Andrae, 295
II1. 445, 129 N.E. 178 (1920) holds that a prior conviction may be shown, to impeach
a witness, though no sentence was imposed. Followed in the spirit of the Viberg case
this could lead to the same result.
DISCOVERY OF INCOME TAX RETURNS
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Among the privileges of an individual, once held most sacrosanct, were
those relating to the privacy of his income tax returns. This is no longer
true. This so called "immunity" has been steadily reduced for the last
thirty-five years.
COMMENTS
In a recent decision, which exemplifies the current trend, the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota has concluded that the
federal income tax returns of one seeking a tort recovery are subject to dis-
covery by the opposing party to the litigation.'
With this case another link has been forged in the chain of decisions
and amended regulations which have consistently increased the number
of parties entitled to examine once "privileged" individual federal income
tax returns,2 since the original invasion by presidential order in 192 1.
3
Presently, the regulations state: "A copy of a return may be furnished to
any person who is entitled to inspect such return, upon a written applica-
tion therefor, and the submission of evidence, satisfactory to the Commis-
sioner, of his right to receive the same. ' 4 The modem rule may be found
in Section 6103 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code which refers to such
returns as "Public Records," but open only upon an order of the President,
and under certain rules and regulations approved by him. State officers at
the request of the governor of the state may have access to certain cor-
porate returns. State bodies or commissions having been charged with the
administration of various state tax laws may have access to all federal in-
come tax returns. All bona fide shareholders of record owning one per
cent or more of the outstanding stock of a corporation may have access
to that corporation's returns; certain designated Congressional committees
may, under given circumstances, have access to certain returns. All these
are, of course, in addition to the ruling that one may obtain copies of his
own returns upon a proper request to the Commissioner.
These rules are, for the most part, clearly defined. It is only where an
individual has access to his own return and is requested, by a party seek-
ing discovery in a lawsuit, to produce such returns that a wealth of litiga-
tion may be found. The result has been the liberalization of discovery pro-
cedure with regard to federal income tax returns under Section 34 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 Due to the scope of the problem, this
1 Karlsson v. Wolfson, 18 F.R.D. 474 (D.C. Minn., 1956).
2 E.g., Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, 488 (1872), "The law holds this infor-
mation to be among the secrets of state." 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2377 (3d ed., 1940).
Originally, seventeen states made various state tax returns "confidential" or "privileged."
Presently only seven states still use such terms. The remainder speak of such returns as
"confidential except to proper authorities or by order of a court of competent juris-
diction." Also consult the pocket supp. (1952) where Illinois terms the Retail Occupa-
tional Tax Return "confidential," and also says, "The copy of a Federal Estate Tax
Return filed with the Attorney General shall be confidential."
S St. (Nov. 23, 1921) Income Tax § 257 as reiterated and refined in Executive Order
8320 (Aug. 28, 1939), returns shall be opened upon compliance with the rules promul-
gated in 26 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 458.50-458.71 (1949) and approved by the President on
the same date.
4 26 Code Fed. Regs. S 458.205 (1949).
5 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 34.
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comment will limit itself to civil actions, as brought in the Federal courts
by private parties.
In the most recent case, an action for personal injury, the defendant
moved for production of plaintiff's federal income tax returns, and the court
ruled that information as to plaintiff's prior earning capacity, as reflected
in his income tax return, was of prime importance in determining the ex-
tent of the damages suffered as a result of his alleged inability to continue
work, so that there was the necessary good cause for discovery: On the
privilege question, the court said: "... While a federal income tax return
is privileged, it is privileged only in so far as unauthorized public scrutiny
is concerned."6 The court then added that whereas the defendants have
no right to secure copies of the plaintiff's returns from the Internal Rev-
enue Department, a court can compel a party to himself secure such a
copy, and make it available to the moving party under Rule 34.
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is patterned after the
"Rules Under the English Judicature Act," former Federal "Equity Rule
58," and various American state statutes authorize a court to order parties
in possession or control of documents to produce them, and permit the
moving party to inspect and copy them for use at the trial.7 It reads in
part:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, and upon notice to
all other parties .... the court in which an action is pending may (1) order
any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing
of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photograph ob-
jects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
pertaining to any of the matters within the scope of the examination... and
which are in his possession, custody, or control ... (2) the order shall specify
the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking the copies and
photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.8
Most courts construe this rule liberally. 9 The minority is quite small1 °
and will be reviewed below under the title "Good Cause." All the courts
agree that the rule contemplates an exercise of judgment by the court, not
the mere automatic granting of a motion. "The Court's judgment is to be
moved by a demonstration by the moving party of its need, for the pur-
poses of the trial, of such discovery of the documents or papers sought,"'
6 Karlsson v. Wolfson, 18 F.R.D. 474,476 (D.C. Minn., 1956).
7 2 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, S 791.
8 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 34.
9 E.g., June v. Peterson, 155 F. 2d 963 (C.A. 7th., 1946).
10 E.g., Condry v. Buckeye S.S. Co., 4 F.R.D. 310 (W.D. Pa., 1945). At page 312, the
court said this rule is not available for discovery purposes, "but is only a proceeding for
the production of designated documents which contain material evidence."
11 Martin v. Capital Transit Co., 170 F. 2d 811, 812 (App. D.C., 1948).
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on the theory that opportunities for factual suppression and surprise at
the trial are to be avoided. 12
On the liberality of construction of Rule 34, the decisions range all the
way from "[t]hese rules permit fishing for evidence"' 13 to "[tlhis rule was
not intended to permit a party to engage in a fishing expedition.' 4 The
majority position is that "[a] subpoena will be effectuated by the court
unless it is unreasonable and oppressive, or unless the court, acting on ap-
plicable and lawfully consistent executive regulations, concludes that the
national interest, or the specific situation as embodied in the record, justi-
fies withholding discovery."15
The leading case of Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. Ram 6 lays
down four requisites for the issuance of a judicial order to produce docu-
ments under Rule 34: (1) good cause and notice to all parties; (2) that
the documents be in the possession, custody, or control of the party or-
dered to produce; (3) that the documents be not privileged; and (4) that
the documents constitute or contain evidence relative to the subject mat-
ter of the trial. Each of the "requisites" will be discussed in turn.
GOOD CAUSE
In the question of what constitutes good cause, whether pertaining to
discovery rules, or to any other question, judicial discretion has inevitably
produced conflicting authority. The minority is found mostly among the
older cases, which emphasized materiality in the determination of the
right to discovery by a moving party. As examples, in United States v.
National City Bank" and Rosenblum v. Dingfelder,i s the courts used
identical language-"A party moving for inspection and discovery must
show good cause and the materiality and relevancy of the documents to
the issues." The District Court of Kentucky, citing these cases, said:
12Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933 (D.C. Hawaii, 1947).
'
5 Golden v. Arcadia Mutual Casualty Co., 3 F.R.D. 26 (N.D. Ill., 1942); Monarch
Liquor Corp. v. Schenley Distillers Corp., 2 F.R.D. 51 (N.D. N.Y., 1941); Canty v.
Great Lakes Transit Corp., 2 F.R.D. 156 (W.D. N.Y., 1941); Hercules Powder Co. v.
Rohm and Haas Co., 4 F.R.D. 452 (D.C. Del., 1944); Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appli-
ances Co., 8 F.R.D. 11, 21 (W.D. Pa., 1948) where the court said: "The time-honored
cry of 'Fishing expedition' [is no defense to a motion under this rule]." Accord: June v.
Peterson, supra.
14 Archer v. Cornillaud, 41 F. Supp. 435, 436 (W.D. Ky., 1941). Accord: Eastern
States Corp. v. Eisler, 181 Md. 526, 30 A. 2d 867 (1943).
15 Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933, 935 (D.C. Hawaii, 1947); Vendola
Corp. v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 1 F.R.D. 359, 360 (S.D. N.Y., 1940).
16 91 F. Supp. 778 (D.C. S.C., 1950).
'740 F. Supp. 99, 101 (S.D. N.Y., 1941).
182 F.R.D. 309, 310 (S.D. N.Y., 1941). This decision goes on to add that the moving
party must show that the documents are necessary to him in the preparation of his case.
Accord: Heiner v. North American Coal Corp., 3 F.R.D. 63 (W.D. Pa., 1942).
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A party not only must designate specifically the particular books and records
that contain the information desired, but must also state facts showing that the
information is material to the issue. 19
The later cases are considerably more liberal, and represent what is now
the majority view. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
for example, has said ". . . if the documents called for are reasonably prob-
able to be material in the case, the production and inspection of them
should be allowed. ' 20 In United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc.,
the court ruled that the justification for a discovery is sufficiently shown if
the complaint and supporting evidence indicate that the documents
[sought] may relate or be material to the subject matter of the suit ' 2 1
while the view of the District Court of Mississippi was simply that, "...
this rule is broad and flexible, and there is wide latitude as to what con-
stitutes good cause. '22
The safest view to follow, however, seems to be the non-committal at-
tude shown in Zirmnerman v. Poindexter, wherein it was stated: "Oppor-
tunities for factual suppression and surprise at the trial should be avoided
by the court, if possible, after considering all of the relevant interests le-
gally and prudently to be considered in the specific situation. '23 This
holding was reviewed and reinforced by the Appellate Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia where the court held that orders under the discovery
rules are in a large manner discretionary with the trial court, and are
founded on the facts.24
The only certainty in this field is that "as to what precisely is meant by
good cause the cases do not indicate with any degree of certainty. '25 Once
decided at the trial level, however, "the Court of Appeals will not disturb
the action of the trial court in respect to them, unless the action was im-
19 Archer v. Comillaud, 41 F. Supp. 435, 436 (D.C. Ky., 1941). Accord: Gill v. Col-
Tex Refining Co., I F.R.D. 255 (S.D. Tex., 1940); cf. Courteau v. Interlake S.S. Co.,
1 F.R.D. 525, 526 (W.D. Mich., 1941): "A statement by the attorney for a party seek-
ing production of documents, that they constitute relevant and material evidence, is not
sufficient to support the motion, the affidavits should disclose facts to enable the court
to determine the issue of relevancy."
20June v. Peterson, 155 F. 2d 963 (C.A. 7th, 1946).
21 2 F.R.D. 425 (W.D. N.Y., 1942); Beler v. Savarona Ship Corp., 26 F. Supp. 599
(E.D. N.Y., 1939): "A party seeking a discovery of documents need not prove their
materiality, but need only establish that it is reasonably probable that the documents
constitute or contain material evidence."
22 Leach v. Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 2 F.R.D. 444, 446 (D.C. Miss., 1942); cf.
United Mercantile Agencies v. Silver Fleet Motor Express, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 709 (D.C. Ky.,
1941): "The good cause and materiality necessary to support a motion need not be
shown by affidavit if such prerequisites appear on the face of the records."
23 74 F. Supp. 933, 935 (D.C. Hawaii, 1947).
24 Carter v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 152 F. 2d 129 (App. D.C., 1945).
25 Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F. 2d 212 (C.A. 3d, 1945), aff'd 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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provident, and effected the substantial rights of the parties."'26 An order
for discovery under this rule is interlocutory, and not appealable,27 but is
reviewable only on appeal from the final judgment.28 An appellate court
will not issue a writ of prohibition against a trial judge who, in the exer-
cise of his discretion, has granted discovery.29
POSSESSION, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL
At least one court has said, "this rule is limited to documents in posses-
sion of a party to the action." °30 However, greater weight of authority fol-
lows the wording of Rule 3431 to the effect that a party may be "required
to produce documents which are under his control, without [his] having
actual possession of them."32 Further, that the opposing party will have to
go to great labor and expense in order to comply with an order for dis-
covery is not grounds for a denial of the motion33 "unless the hardship
would be unreasonable. '13 4 Nevertheless, it is normally held that the bur-
den and expense of making copies and photographs of such documents
should be cast on the moving party.3 5
It has even been held that an attorney may be required to produce doc-
uments, not in his own, but in his client's possession, custody or control,
26 Carter v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 152 F. 2d 129, 131 (App. D.C., 1945).
27 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 102 F. 2d 702 (C.A. 3d, 1939); Zalutka v. Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co., 108 F. 2d 405 (C.A. 7th, 1939); O'Malley v. Chrysler Corp., 160
F. 2d 35 (C.A. 7th, 1947); cf. Fenton v. Walling, 139 F. 2d 608 (C.A. 9th, 1944); Penn-
sylvania R. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 203 F. 2d 149 (C.A. 3d, 1953).
28 Zalutka v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra; see, however, Niagara Dupli-
cator Co., Inc. v. Shackleford, 160 F. 2d 25 (App. D.C., 1947) where an appeal was
allowed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia under D.C. Code 5 17-101
and the order of the District court was reversed for abuse of discretion. Cf. Carter v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., supra.
29 Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis v. Moore, 145 F. 2d 128 (C.A. 8th, 1944); see also
Keaton v. Kennamer, 42 F. 2d 814 (C.A. 10th, 1930).
30 Beegle v. Thompson, 2 F.R.D. 82, 83 (N.D. Ill., 1941): "This rule is limited to
documents in possession of a party to the action." Cf. Orange County Theatre, Inc. v.
Levy, 26 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. N.Y., 1938); Flynn v. Magraw, 27 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. N.Y.,
1939); Welty v. Clute, 2 F.R.D. 429 (W.D. N.Y., 1939).
31 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 34; consult 2 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 791.
82As cited in United Mercantile Agencies v. Silver Fleet Motor Express Co., 1 F.R.D.
709, 712 (D.C. Ky., 1941).
3 United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 425 (W.D. N.Y., 1942).
84 2 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 796.
3s Niagara Duplicator Co., Inc. v. Shackleford, 160 F. 2d 25 (App. D.C., 1947); see,
however, Reeves v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 80 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D.C. Del., 1948): "In
view of the fact that obtaining copies of income tax returns may involve expense, the
order for production of such copies should include the provision that the expense of
such shall be advanced or be borne by the party seeking such production."
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and be held responsible to the court for such production under threat of
citation for contempt s6
That individual federal income tax returns are within the control of a
taxpayer, even though he no longer has possession of his own copies, is
clearly indicated wherever the question has arisen. In Reeves v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co., the court said,
If a party has retained copies of his income tax returns, production thereof
can be required under rule "34" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure....
A party who has not retained copies of his income tax returns can be required
to obtain copies of the returns by inspection of such returns in the office of
the Collector [now Director] of Internal Revenue, and can be required to pro-
duce these copies (Executive Order 8-28-39, Number 8230) and will be en-
titled to reimbursement by the movent for any expenses thereof.s7
In the case of Nola Electric, Inc. v. Reilly, the court ordered the de-
fendant to apply to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for copies of
such documents and to produce same for inspection and copying, stating
that "a party can be compelled to secure such a copy from the Internal
Revenue Authorities." 8s
PRIVILEGE
In the Karlsson case, as noted earlier, the court said: "While a federal
income tax return is privileged, it is privileged only in so far as unauthor-
ized public scrutiny is concerned. '3 9 This rule is based on the regulations,
and is followed in all but a very few decisions. There are however, sever-
al courts which persistently cling to the old idea that income tax returns
are privileged in private actions. For example, in O'Connell v. Olson, it
was held that ". . . income tax returns are, in private civil actions, confi-
dential information between the taxpayer and the government, and not
open to inspection." 40 The District Court, admitted the contrary author-
ity of the Court of Appeals in the Reeves41 case, but refused to be bound
thereby. This court apparently reasoned that since the statute provided for
disclosure of such returns only to certain parties, including the taxpayer
and his attorney in fact, but not including the federal courts; that until
provision is made by federal statute, or by regulation, for the production
of these returns on an order of a federal court, such returns should be
s6 Monks v. Hurley, 28 F. Supp. 600 (D.C. Mass., 1939); Bough v. Lee, 26 F. Supp.
1000 (S.D. N.Y., 1939).
87 80 F. Supp. 107, 108 (D.C. Del., 1948); Accord: Tollefsen v. Phillips, 16 F.R.D. 348
(D.C. Mass., 1954). Of course all decisions in this vein emanate from the commissioner's
original ruling, 26 Code Fed. Regs. § 458.205.
88 11 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D. N.Y., 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 951 (1951).
89 Karlsson v. Wolfson, 18 F.R.D. 474, 476 (D.C. Minn., 1956).
40 2 U.S.T.C. 9450 (1949). See authorities cited note 2 supra.
4' Reeves v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 80 F. Supp. 107 (D.C. Del., 1948).
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privileged in private civil litigation. The same judge used the O'Connell
case as his primary authority in deciding Loew's, Inc. v. Martin, a case in-
volving similar facts. 42
In Maddox v. Wright,43 another District Court, relying on the O'Con-
nell and Loew's cases took the same view, using identical language. Still
again, in 1954 the same words were repeated, this time by the District
Court of Tennessee where the court added, "By force of statute, income
tax returns are confidential communications between taxpayer and gov-
ernment, and are not directly available to third parties. ' 44 Presumably the
court was thinking of a local statute referring to certain state tax returns
as "confidential."
These rulings are inexplicably contrary, not only to the vast majority
of decisions, but also apparently contrary to the intent of the Regulations.
The Code of Federal Regulations expressly provides that the taxpayer, or
"any person who is entitled" may obtain copies of a return.45 The In-
ternal Revenue Code, as quoted earlier in this article, clearly labels the
returns "Public Records" open to third parties under certain Presidential
rules and regulations, and always to the taxpayer himself.
Once in the hands of the taxpayer, whether as copies originally retained
or as copies obtained by him from the Internal Revenue Office in compli-
ance with a court order, few decisions permit these returns a privileged
status, but treat them as they would any other documents.
"[Copies of federal] income tax returns in the possession of a party to
the action are not privileged," say the courts, "and therefore are subject
to production."46 The District Court of New York agreed:
Federal Income Tax Returns are not confidential information between a tax-
payer and the government, and where a party to an action has retained copies
of such returns, he may be required to produce them pursuant to rules pro-
viding for discovery of documents by any party.4 7
Following and extending this rule, the Reeves case held that: "Where a
party has not retained copies of his income tax returns he may be ordered
to inspect such returns as were filed, and obtain copies thereof for pro-
duction in court. '48
42 10 F.R.D. 143 (N.D. Ohio, 1949). Accord: United Motion Picture Co. v. Ealand,
199 F. Supp. 371 (C.A. 6th, 1952).
48 1 U.S.T.C. 9355 (1952).
44 Austin v. Aluminum Co. of America, 15 F.R.D. 490 (D.C. Tenn., 1954).
45 26 Code Fed. Regs. (1949), S 458.205, extensively quoted supra.46 Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 1 F.R.D. 190, 192 (D.C.
Conn., 1940); Welty v. Clute, 2 F.R.D. 429 (W.D. N.Y., 1939); Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
Inc. v. Tar Asphalt Trucking Co., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 216 (D.C. N.J., 1939); Dickheiser v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 5 F.R.D. 5 (E.D. Pa., 1945), aff'd 155 F. 2d 266 (1946).
4TConnecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D. N.Y., 1945).48 Reeves v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 80 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D.C. Del., 1948).
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On the privilege question, the case of Bough v. Lee,49 laid down the
rule that a party has the right to a determination by the court on the
question of privilege. In refining this rule, the court in the Nola case, when
ordering the defendant to apply to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
for copies of documents, and to produce such copies for the plaintiff's in-
spection and copying, said:
Privileges defeating legitimate objects of discovery should not be extended
unless clearly indicated .... Income Tax returns are classified as "Public
Records" 26 U.S.C.A. §55, but administrative regulations do not allow third
parties access to them, but permit inspection by the maker of the return, or his
representative, and so are held by most courts not "privileged," and a party
can be compelled to secure a copy from the Internal Revenue Authorities.50
EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO SUBJECT MATTER
Although most courts have held that it is not permissible, in granting a
motion for production of documents under Rule 34, to order a general
search and inspection of all records so that the moving party may find
what he may want,51 such documents must be produced on request if a
showing of materiality to the subject matter of the trial is sufficiently
demonstrated. 52 In fact, "Sanctions may be applied for a failure to pro-
duce such documents . . . if it appears that such failure was the result of
efforts to obstruct the [action] and thereby impede the true administra-
tion of justice."58
The Circuit Court of Appeals in June v. Peterson54 held that a lower
court's denial of a motion for an order requiring a party to produce such
documents would be error where the documents called for are material to
the allegations of the moving party.
A typical decision as to materiality may be found in Garrett v. Faust,
where they were "not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
49 Bough v. Lee, 26 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. N.Y., 1939).
50Nola Electric, Inc. v. Reilly, 11 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D. N.Y., 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 951 (1951). Accord: Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. Ram, 91 F. Supp.
778, 780 (D.C. S.C., 1950). Motion to produce tally sheets, ticket records and income
tax returns would be granted despite privilege .... "This rule has been liberally con-
strued to permit inspection of records and thus narrow the issues to be tried, eliminate
the element of surprise, and effect speedier and less costly disposition of controversies."
Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F. 2d 213 (C.A. 3d, 1945), aff'd 329 U.S. 495 (1947) where,
at page 507 the court said, ". . . discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment... copies of tax returns are not privileged."
51 United States v. American Optical Co., 2 F.R.D. 534 (S.D. N.Y., 1942); Archer v.
Cornillaud, 41 F. Supp. 435 (D.C. Ky., 1941); Eastern States Corp. v. Eisler, 181 Md. 526,
30 A. 2d 867 (1943).
52 Gill v. Col-Tex Refining Co., 1 F.R.D. 255 (S.D. Tex., 1940).
58 Moinester v. Wilson and Cox Co., Inc., I F.R.D. 247 (S.D. N.Y., 1940).
54 155 F. 2d 963 (CA. 7th, 1946).
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admissible evidence" 55 on the basic issues of the particular case, and where
the defendant has already submitted to the plaintiff other records of his
business activities during the period in dispute, and where denial of said
production would not unduly prejudice preparation of the plaintiff's case.
Elsewhere, in an action for damages caused by fire and explosion, the
defendants were adjudged to be entitled to see the plaintiff's income tax
returns to determine the value placed on the destroyed property.5" Again,
in an action to compel defendants to account for dividends unpaid, and
stock unissued, plaintiff was entitled to production of personal federal
income tax returns made by the trustee of the stock and by said trustee's
wife,5 7 and in Connor v. Gilmore,5s a widow, in an action for husband's
death, was ordered to request a copy of her husband's federal returns
from the proper authorities, to be opened to defendant's inspection.
ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS
Among the many additional problems, closely related to this topic, two
are worthy of further discussion. The first proposition enlarges, even fur-
ther, the opportunities of one seeking discovery of such items as the tax
returns in question.
Discovery under Rule 34, according to its own context, is subject only
to those limitations as are within the scope of an examination under Rule
26 (b). 5 9 The latter reads in part, "It is not grounds for objection that the
[information so discovered] would be inadmissible at the trial if [it] ap-
pears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence."'60 Federal income tax returns would seem to fall into this category
in many situations.
That attorneys may make good use of this unusual opportunity is dem-
onstrated by the liberal treatment shown by the courts. "Admissibility in
evidence is not a prerequisite to the right of discovery and inspection un-
der subdivision (b) of this rule." '6 1 The District Court of New York later
amplified its own earlier ruling, saying that the deposition-discovery pro-
cedure is intended not only to produce evidence to be used at the trial, but
also to secure information that may lead to the production of other rele-
55 8 F.R.D. 556, 557 (E.D. Pa., 1949).
56 Merriman v. Cities Service Gas Co., 11 F.R.D. 584 (W.D. Mo., 1951).
57 Muller v. Muller, 14 F.R.D. 142 (D.C. Alaska, 1953).
5 8 Connor v. Gilmore, 45 Del. 184, 70 A. 2d 262 (1949).
59 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 34.
60 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 26(b).
61 United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19, 21 (E.D. N.Y., 1952). Accord:
Foremost Promotions, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 15 F.R.D. 128 (N.D. Ill., 1953); see
Shawmut Inc. v. American Viscose Corp., 11 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. N.Y., 1951).
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vant evidence. '6 2 Does this exclude Income Tax from otherwise privileged
status in the few courts still recognizing them as such. The answer is not
clear. However, the old adage about ways to skin a cat seems particularly
appropriate here.
Although the New York Court still later stated that "liberal deposition
procedure is not to be used as a litigation tactic to harass the other
party,' 63 it appears that if counsel is determined to see the other party's
tax returns, he has enough ammunition to use one way or another to
achieve his ends.
The second question regards the use of the Fifth Amendment as grounds
for refusing to comply with an order to produce such returns, as self-in-
crimination, where the party could face criminal prosecution for some
reason disclosed by the returns.
In enumerating the protective benefits of the amendment, one eminent
writer said:
[Such] protection extends not only to accused persons, but to wimesses as
well; ... The enactments apply in all kinds of proceedings where testimony is
to be offered, civil as well as criminal, in equity as well as at law, out of court as
well as in court. [The party inquired of] ... may refuse to answer, not only to
the crime itself, but also as to any circumstances or any link in the chain of
proof from which the crime itself, but also as to any circumstances or any link
in the chain of proof from which the crime may be inferred. 64
This privilege, normally, is limited to criminal matter. "The purpose
and effect of this clause are to secure a witness from the danger of a crim-
inal prosecution against him which may be aided by his forced disclosures;
not to enable such witness to withhold testimony merely because it might
tend to subject him to the results of a civil action." 65
However, it has been held that the right in question may be invaded by
compelling a witness to produce books and papers, rather than oral testi-
mony, which contain matters tending to incriminate him, though some of
the authorities have taken a contrary view. 66 The tax returns in question
would seem, nevertheless, to be available despite this conflict of opinions,
because they fall into the category of records required by law to be kept.
Such records, by the great weight of authority ". . . are not protected by
02 Tobe-Deitschmann Corp. v. United Aircraft Products, 15 F.R.D. 363, 364 (S.D.
N.Y,. 1953); Kaiser-Fraser Corp. v. Otis & Co., 11 F.R.D. 50, 54 (S.D. N.Y., 1951).
63Armstrong Cork Co. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 16 F.R.D. 389, 390 (S.D.
N.Y., 1954).
64 3 Jones, Evidence § 884, 885 (4th ed., 1938).
65 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892); United States v. Brooks, 284
F. 908 (E.D. Mich., 1922).
6 Commissioner v. Southern Express Co., 160 Ky. 1, 169 S.W. 517 (1914); Accord:
Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, 287 F. 138 (W.D. N.Y., 1923); Contra: In Re
Strouse, 1 Sawyer (U.S.) 605 (1871).
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privilege against self-incrimination, and an individual defendant, notwith-
standing his constitutional rights against self incrimination which would
[otherwise] excuse him from producing personal records, could be com-
pelled to produce those records which he is required by law to keep. '"67
Once again the opportunity to examine such returns has passed another
hurdle.
CONCLUSION
Thus it is apparent that individual federal income tax returns are avail-
able to a moving party in civil actions, at least in the majority of the fed-
eral courts if they can be shown to be germane to the issues at hand, or
to be likely to lead to other pertinent information, by use of the deposi-
tion-discovery rules.
Even the stumbling blocks of inadmissibility in evidence, 8 and the de-
fense of self-incrimination do not preclude their availability to the attor-
ney who makes intelligent use of these rules.
Clearly, the words "privilege" and "confidential" have lost much of
their force with reference to these returns. Individual federal income tax
returns can no longer be considered personal to the maker and the Reve-
nue Department. The answer to the question "Are your income tax returns
your own?" is most probably "No."
67 United States v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 48, 50 (D.C. Miss., 1947); Bowles v. Amato,
60 F. Supp. 361 (D.C. Colo., 1945).
68 Republic of Italy v. De Angelis, 14 F.R.D. 519, 520 (S.D. N.Y., 1953): "Under rules
relative to inspection of documents it is not necessary to establish the admissibility of
the documents, but it is sufficient if the documents concern matters generally bearing
on the issue and there is a reasonable probability that the documents contain material
evidence."
ADMISSIBILITY OF INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS
CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT FACTS
Confessions, generally, must be voluntary before they are admissible in
evidence. Thus statements of an accused person that are induced by threats
or promises of benefit are inadmissible as evidence, because such state-
ments are likely to be influenced by these inducements.
It sometimes happens that, by means of an involuntary confession, facts
are discovered which are relevant to a case. Evidence of such facts is uni-
versally admissible.' The question then arises whether the confession or
some part of it should also be admitted if it is verified by evidence dis-
covered subsequently.
Before discussing what part, if any, of the confession should be ad-
1 Wigmore, Evidence § 859 (3rd ed., 1940) (supp., 1955); Wharton, Criminal Evi-
dence S 600 (11th ed., 1935).
